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A new model about cascading occurrences caused by perturbation is established to search after the
mechanism because of which catastrophes in networks occur. We investigate the avalanche dynamics
of our model on 2-dimension Euclidean lattices and scale-free networks and find out the avalanche
dynamic behaviors is very sensitive to the topological structure of networks. The experiments show
that the catastrophes occur much more frequently in scale-free networks than in Euclidean lattices
and the greatest catastrophe in scale-free networks is much more serious than that in Euclidean
lattices. Further more, we have studied how to reduce the catastrophes’ degree, and have schemed
out an effective strategy, called targeted safeguard-strategy for scale-free networks.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b, 05.10.-a. 45.70.Ht, 89.75.Hc
Many social, biological, and communication systems
can be properly described as complex networks with ver-
tices representing individuals or organizations and edges
mimicking the interactions among them. Recently, the
ubiquity of a power-law degree distribution in real-life
networks has attracted a lot of attention[1]. Examples
of such networks (scale-free networks or SF networks
for short) are numerous: these include the Internet, the
World Wide Web, social networks of acquaintance or
other relations between individuals, metabolic networks,
integer networks, food webs, etc.[2]. The ultimate goal
of the study of the topological structure of networks is
to understand and explain the workings of systems built
upon those networks, for instance, to understand how the
topology of the World Wide Web affects Web surfing and
search engines, how the structure of social networks af-
fects the spread of diseases, information, rumors or other
things, how the structure of a food web affects population
dynamics, and so on.
The catastrophes in real-life networks can be see ev-
erywhere, such as the traffic jams taking place in road-
networks, the communication congestions taking place in
internet, the economic crisis taking place in the network
of financial institutions, and so on. Therefore, it is not
only of major theoretic interest, but also of great prac-
tical significance to understand the mechanism because
of which those catastrophes occur. Intuitively, one may
consider the breakdown of plentiful vertices or edges at
the same time in networks to be the reason[3]. He is un-
doubtedly right as it is easy to imagine the damage of
roads or the failure of servers lead to a serious traffic jam
or communication congestion, respectively. However, in
most situations, the catastrophes surrounding us are not
like that. In the present letter, a man named “Pertur-
bation” is caught, who is indicted to be the causer in
most catastrophes.
Bianconi and Marsili referred to an example about
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the catastrophe caused by perturbation[4]. The exam-
ple they mentioned is routing tables in the internet,
which can be considered as a dynamic communication
network. In the beginning, a change (perturbation) in
some router’s table may inadvertently cause congestion
at some node downstream. This may trigger several other
changes in that local neighborhood, as routers try to
avoid the congested node. But these changes may, in
their turn, cause further congestion elsewhere, and the
problem may expand even further, as a large avalanche
(catastrophe), to a wider region. Similar phenomena may
take place in various networks.
Bak, Tang andWiesenfeld introduced a so-called sand-
pile model (BTW model) to explain such cascading oc-
currences on networks, which is considered as a pro-
totypical theoretical model exhibiting the catastrophes
(avalanche behavior) caused by perturbation[5]. How-
ever, BTW model is based on the Euclidean lattices,
which are very different from the reality for the real-life
networks that have power-law degree distribution. In
addition, the open boundary conditions make it hard to
directly extend BTW model onto SF networks. Olami,
Feder and Christensen established a model (OFC model)
of earthquakes in nonconservative systems[6], which may
be more appropriate to mimic the catastrophes in SF net-
works than BTW model for all the real-life systems are
nonconservative.
Recently, a few interesting and significant works about
how the topological structure of networks affects self-
organized criticality (SOC) based on BTW model or
OFC model have been achieved. Lise, et al investi-
gated the OFC model on annealed and quenched random
networks[7], Arcangelis and Herrmann studied the BTW
model on small-world networks[8]. Motter and Lai stud-
ied the cascade-based attacks on SF networks and have
found that a large-scale cascade nay be triggered by re-
moving a single key vertex[9]. Goh, et al investigated the
avalanche dynamics on SF networks using BTW model
and obtained the exponent τ for the power-law avalanche
size distribution and the dynamic exponent z[10]. Their
work concentrated on the existence of SOC, thus they
2did not discuss whether the catastrophes occur more fre-
quently in SF networks than Euclidean lattices. In addi-
tion, since the threshold value of each vertices is assigned
to be equal to its degree, one can not make sure which
(the power-law degree distribution, the power-law thresh-
old height distribution or both) is the main reason that
lead to the power-law distribution of avalanche size.
In the present letter, a model similar to OFC’s is estab-
lished to mimic the catastrophes occurring in networks.
We have found that the catastrophes occur much more
frequently in SF networks than in Euclidean lattices and
the greatest catastrophe in SF networks is much more
serious than that in Euclidean lattices. Further more, we
have studied how to reduce the catastrophes’ degree, and
have schemed out an effective safeguard-strategy for SF
networks.
In our model, to each vertices of the network is asso-
ciated a real variable Fx, which initially takes the value
0 and can be considered as energy, tension, flux or some
other things. At each time step, a perturbation δ is added
to a randomly chosen vertex x, which means the variable
Fx increases by δ, where δ is randomly selected in the
interval (0, 1). If Fx reaches or exceeds the threshold
value Zx, then the vertex x becomes unstable and the
(1 − ε)Zx energies topple to its neighbor-nodes, with a
small fraction ε of energies being lost: Fx → Fx − Zx,
and Fy → Fy + (1− ε)Zx/d(x) for all vertices y adjacent
to x, where d(x) is the degree of vertex x that denotes
the number of neighbor-vertices of x. The parameter ε
controls the level of conservation of the dynamics and it
takes values between 0 and 1, where ε = 0 corresponds
to the conservative case. Here, to avoid the system being
overloaded in the end, ε is always set to be larger than 0.
If this toppling causes any of the adjacent vertices receiv-
ing energies to be unstable, subsequent toppling follow
on those nodes in parallel until there is no unstable node
left. This process defines an avalanche.
In some networks like the internet, the vertex
with greater degree may have more throughput, thus
Goh’s designation for threshold value of vertices is
reasonable[10]. But in other networks (such as neural
networks, social networks and so on), there are not any
evidences that the individual having more neighbors is of
greater endurance, thus it is worthy to study the case that
heterogeneous vertices are of the same threshold value.
Therefore, in our model, the threshold values are assigned
to be the same as Zx = Z = 1 for all vertices x, which is
different fromGoh’s, It is notable that our designation for
threshold value is helpful to clearly understand how the
topology of networks affects the degree of catastrophe.
We are interested in the avalanche size S, which can
be used to measure the degree of catastrophe[11] and de-
fined as the number of toppling events in a give avalanche
(We set S = 0 if there is no toppling events occur-
ring). Figure 1 shows a typical result about the distribu-
tion of avalanche size. The Euclidean lattice mentioned
in this paper is a two-dimensional square lattice with
open boundary conditions, and the SF networks here are
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FIG. 1: The distribution of avalanche size, where ε = 0.01.
The red and black curves represent the cases of Euclidean
lattice and SF network respectively, where P (S) denotes
the number of avalanches with give size S. The maximal
avalanche size in SF network is 8829 and the corresponding
quantity in Euclidean lattice is 1799. Both the two networks
are of 4900 vertices. The data shown here is obtained by
106 + 105 iterations exclusive of initial 105 time steps.
gained by Baraba´si and Albert’s method[12] with param-
eters m0 = m = 2, thus both the two types of networks
are of average degree 〈d〉 ≃ 4. One can see that the
distribution of avalanche size in SF network follows a
straight line for more than 3 decades, which indicates
that there is SOC in avalanche behavior. But the distri-
bution of avalanche size in Euclidean lattice, which is a
power-law curve in the left part followed by an approx-
imately exponential truncation, is not similar to that in
SF network. Therefore, the dynamic behaviors in those
two types of networks are different. The presence of SOC
in the nonconservative OFC model has been controver-
sial since the very introduction of the model[13] and it is
still debated[14]. Since the main goal of this letter is to
study the catastrophes occurring in networks, we won’t
give detailed experiment results and analysis on how the
network structure affects the existence of SOC, which will
be given elsewhere[15].
Getting to business, one can find that although the two
networks are of the same network-size[16] and have the
same average avalanche size (apparently, 〈S〉 = 〈δ〉
εZ
=
50), the maximal avalanche size Smax in SF networks
is much greater than that in Euclidean lattice, which
means the greatest catastrophe in SF network is much
more serious than that in Euclidean lattice. In SF net-
works, the number of avalanches with its size larger than
C is 12291, and the corresponding quantity in Euclidean
lattice is 231, which shows that the catastrophes occur
much more frequently in SF network than in Euclidean
lattice. For the sake of reducing the error, more exper-
iments have been achieved, figure 2a&2b show the de-
pendence of Smax and the number of catastrophes with
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FIG. 2: The degree and frequency of catastrophes occurring
in the two types of networks. In those two figures, for a fixed
N , the data are obtained by 10 independent experiments, the
results anent SF networks and Euclidean lattices are repre-
sented by black (upper) dots and the red (lower) stars respec-
tively. a, the size of greatest catastrophes in SF networks is
much more than that in Euclidean lattices, and the disparity
becomes greater and greater as the network-size increases. b,
the frequency of catastrophes[11] occurring in SF networks is
about 50 times higher than that in Euclidean lattices.
the number of vertices N , which convictively confirm the
conclusions mentioned above.
Since there aren’t any effective methods to put an end
to perturbations, it is worthwhile to study how to re-
duce the catastrophes’ degree. Here, for theoretic sim-
plification, a safeguard-strategy is defined as a vertices
set VP with its elements being protected and will not
topple (mathematically speaking, to protect a vertex x
here means to set its threshold value Zx infinite). In
this letter, two safeguard-strategies are discussed, one is
called random safeguard-strategy (RSS), and the other
one is called targeted safeguard-strategy (TSS). In the
former case, the vertices belonging to VP are randomly
chosen; in the latter one, the vertices with greater degree
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FIG. 3: The catastrophes in networks under vertex-
protecting, where N = 4900 and 〈d〉=4. For a fixed p, the
values shown here are the average over 10 independent ex-
periments. The red squares(), blue triangles(N) and black
circles(•) denote the performance of RSS (TSS) in Euclidean
lattice, RSS in SF network and TSS in SF network, respec-
tively. Figure a, b and c present the maximal avalanche size
Smax, the number of catastrophes D (C = 1000) and the
average avalanche size 〈S〉 as functions of protecting rate p,
respectively. The values of Smax and D are normalized (di-
vided by Smax(0) and D(0)).
4are chosen preferentially. Since almost all the vertices in
Euclidean lattice are of the same degree, RSS and TSS
in Euclidean lattice are not discriminating.
We can always reduce the catastrophes’ degree by pro-
tecting more vertices, but this could bring in economical
and technical pressures. In order to roughly measure the
economical and technical expenses, a parameter p called
protecting rate is defined as the proportion between the
number of vertices being protected and the total number
of vertices: p = |VP |/N . In figure 3, we report the exper-
imental results about the different safeguard-strategies.
In figure 3a, one can find that the RSS in SF networks
is a little more effective than that in Euclidean lattices,
and the TSS in SF networks is much more effective than
RSS. For example, if we want to reduce the maximal
avalanche size on SF network to a tenth by using TSS,
then to protect 0.5% vertices is enough, but if we use
RSS, the protecting rate must be larger than 8%. Ac-
cording to the results shown in figure 3b, if one want
to eliminate the catastrophes, at least 0.3%, 2% and 7%
vertices should be protected by using TSS in SF network,
RSS in Euclidean lattice and RSS in SF network, respec-
tively. One can also make out of figure 3c that TSS in SF
network is much more effective than RSS, for example,
if we set p = 0.01, then the average avalanche size will
reduce to about 5 by using TSS, but the corresponding
value is about 30 for RSS. Altogether, the experimental
results above indicate that TSS is much more effective
than RSS for SF networks. The heterogeneity of vertices
in SF networks is considered to be a possible reason for
these results.
In summary, we have found that the avalanche dy-
namic behaviors are very sensitive to the topological
structure of networks and the catastrophes are much
more serious in SF networks than in Euclidean lattices.
We have studied how to reduce the catastrophes’ degree,
and have schemed out an effective strategy (TSS) for SF
networks, which may be of great significance in practice.
However, there are so many unanswered questions that
puzzle us. At the end of this letter, we will list part of
those.
How does the topological structure of networks affect
the existence of SOC?
Is the highly skewed degree distribution the key rea-
son why the catastrophes in SF networks are much more
serious than those in Euclidean lattices?
How about the performance of limited safeguard-
strategy[17]?
Are there other safeguard-strategies more effective
than TSS for SF networks?
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